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Abstract: Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of 
the human good—in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” 
(Nicomachean Ethics I 7, 1098a17-18) refers to theoretical wisdom—cannot follow from 
the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the 
premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s 
definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a 
single virtue, that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the 
combination of all the others (and this is what kalokagathia seems to be in the Eudemian 
Ethics). I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of 
human eudaimonia only in its primary case. 
 
In the Olympics the prizes do not go to the finest and strongest men but to the competitors—for it 
is some of these who win—and so also in life, happiness is achieved only by those fine and good 




Near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seems to lay the 
foundation for his practical philosophy with a stretch of reasoning known as the “ergon 
 
1 All translations are my own, though I have been influenced by published translations, especially Irwin 
1999 and the translations found in Barnes 1995. I use the Oxford Classical Text edition of Aristotle’s 
Greek, unless otherwise noted. 
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argument.” The conclusion of this argument is an account of the human good as an 
“activity of <the rational part of> the soul on the basis of virtue, and if there are more 
virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most teleios, and moreover in a teleios life” 
(I 7, 1098a16-18). The rest of the Nicomachean Ethics seems to build on this 
foundational definition in various ways (NE I 7, 1098a20-26). 
One can distinguish, broadly speaking, two competing interpretations of the 
definition: either Aristotle is saying that the human good is activity of the soul on the 
basis of the single best virtue (to the exclusion of other virtues) or he is saying that the 
human good is activity of the soul on the basis of the complete set of virtues. These two 
interpretations of the definition generally correspond to two broad camps concerning 
Aristotle’s theory of the human good in general: monists think that the human good is an 
activity on the basis of theoretical wisdom alone, while inclusivists think that the human 
good is an activity on the basis of many different virtues and perhaps even includes 
external goods such as honor, health or friends.2 
In this paper, I present a novel interpretation of the ergon argument by way of 
responding to an often-repeated objection against a monistic interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of the human good. The objection claims that the definition in Nicomachean 
Ethics I 7 cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument when that definition is 
interpreted along monistic lines; this is considered a powerful objection because the 
ergon argument is supposed to contain Aristotle’s own underlying rationale for defining 
the human good as he does. I begin by listing four assumptions that lead one to make this 
objection. After advancing an interpretation of the argument on which a monist reading 
of the definition can indeed follow from the premises, I explain how this interpretation 
offers reasonable alternatives to the four assumptions. I then make two important 
clarifications. First, though my interpretation of the argument does not strictly require a 
monistic reading of the definition of the human good, it does rule out the common 
inclusivist reading. And second, even if one does adopt a monistic interpretation of the 
 
2 What I have called “monism” is sometimes also called “exclusivism,” “intellectualism,” or “dominant end 
theory.” What I have called “inclusivism” is sometimes also called “pluralism” or “comprehensivism.” 
Inclusivism and monism do not exhaust the interpretive possibilities. There are also “gradationist” views, 
and I discuss them in section 8.2. 
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definition, this need not commit one to monism about eudaimonia. This is because the 
definition aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. 
 
2. Overview of the Ergon Argument  
 
At the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics I 7 Aristotle reminds his readers that he 
is seeking the end of things achievable in action (1097a22-23), which he earlier labeled 
“the human good” (NE I 1, 1094b7). He clarifies what he has in mind by saying that this 
best good is the most teleios end: something that is always such as to be rationally-chosen 
on account of itself and never on account of anything else (1097a33-34) while we desire 
everything else for its sake. Aristotle notes that eudaimonia “seems to be this most of all” 
(1097a34) and then explains that the best good, in virtue of being most of all an end, is 
also self-sufficient (1097b6-20). He then gives the ergon argument, which I divide into 
sections A through F along with a prefatory section.  
In this paper I focus on sections A, C, and F, and so I include the text for these 
sections. In the prefatory section (1097b22-25), Aristotle reminds us that we still need to 
say more clearly what the best good is, and he suggests that we will do so if we grasp the 
ergon of a human. 
 
[Section A] This is because in the case of a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and 
generally, in the case of whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, 
the well seems to be <found> in its ergon [ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ 
εὖ], and the same would seem to be true for a human, if he has an ergon.  
(1097b25-28) 
   
In section B (1092b28-33), Aristotle gives two brief reasons to think that a human there is a 
human ergon, and then he asks: 
 
[Section C] Whatever might this be?  For living seems to be something that is common even 
to plants, but what we are seeking is that which is proper [τὸ ἴδιον] to a human.  
One must rule out, then, the life of nutrition and growth.  What follows would be 
some sort of perceptive life, but this too would seem to be common to the horse 
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and ox and every animal.  What is left is some active life of that which has reason 
[πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος].3  Of this, one part has reason in virtue of 
obeying reason, and another part actually has reason and thinks.  And since this 
life is said in two ways4 we should be assuming life as activity since this seems to 
be called life in a primary way. (1097b33-1098a7) 
 
In section D (1098a7-12), Aristotle says that an ergon accomplished well is an ergon 
accomplished on the basis of its proper virtue. In section E (1098a12-15) he repeats some 
important premises and then concludes: 
 
[Section F] and if <all this> is so, then the human good turns out to be <an> activity of the 
<rational part of the human> soul on the basis of virtue, and if there are more 
virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most teleios virtue [κατὰ τὴν 
ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην], and moreover in a teleios life [ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ] for one 
swallow does not make a summer, and in the same way neither does one day or a 
short time make one blessed and happy. (1098a16-20) 
 
I have left two words untranslated: ergon and teleios. The word ergon (“work”) I will 
discuss in section 4, but here some remarks on the word teleios are in order.  
 Interpreters have clashed over the translation of teleios—those with monistic 
inclinations arguing it should be translated “final” or “end-like” while those with 
inclusivist inclinations often arguing it should be translated as “complete.”5 The former 
largely draw on the teleological characterization of teleios in the immediate context of 
NE I 7, where Aristotle seems to take for granted the etymological connection between 
the adjective teleios and the noun telos (“end”). He notes that “what is pursued for its 
own sake is more teleios that what is pursued for the sake of something else” and that 
“what is never chosen for the sake of something else is more teleios than those things that 
 
3 I translate “tou logon echontos”(1098a3-4) as “that which has reason” because this seems to me one way 
to capture the ambiguity of the Greek term logos, which often signifies a “rational account” but can also 
signify the faculty of reason (cf. Phys I 5, 189a7). For discussion of the term see Moss 2014 (with whose 
analysis I only partly agree).  
4 We can speak of "life" as a capacity for living or as the activity of living itself (cf. DA II 5). 
5 One may find an example of the former in Lear 2004, 8-46 and of the latter in Irwin 2012. I say that 
inclusivists “often” translate teleios as “complete,” and that is because there are exceptions: Cooper 1999 
and Walker 2011 both offer inclusivist interpretations of the definition, while conceding that “most teleios 
virtue” both refers to sophia and does not mean “most complete virtue.”  
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are chosen both for themselves and for the sake of it” (NE I 7, 1097a31-34). From this 
perspective, “the most teleios virtue” appears to be sophia, which Aristotle seems to 
identify as the single, teleologically highest virtue.  On the other hand, inclusivist 
interpreters often note that since the phrase “in a teleios life” seems to mean “in a 
complete life” and since it occurs shortly after the phrase “most teleios virtue,” it makes 
sense to interpret teleios in the same way both times. There are also others passages (such 
as NE I 10, 1101a17-21 and VIII 4, 1156b7) where teleios seems to be naturally 
translated as “complete” and only with difficulty translated as “end-like.” From this 
perspective, “most teleios virtue” seems to mean “most complete virtue.”  
I myself will continue to leave the word teleios untranslated, and I do so for three 
reasons. First, I believe that English is not particularly well equipped to convey the 
semantic range of teleios.6 Second, as I will argue below, Aristotle has good reason to 
think that being complete is one way of being end-like—yet this way of thinking about 
the question would seem to cut across the divisions of the traditional debate. Lastly and 
third, finding the best translation of teleios is not strictly necessary for determining 
whether a monistic reading of the definition of the human good can follow from the 
premises of the ergon argument—and it is this latter question that is the primary focus of 
this paper. 
 
3. The Objection and Its Background Assumptions 
 
In his article “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” J. L. Ackrill argues that since “the 
principle of the ergon argument is that one must ask what powers and activities are 
peculiar to and distinctive of man” and since man’s ergon is identified as an activity of 
the rational part of the soul, where this includes activity of both reason itself and the non-
rational part that partakes in reason (NE I 7, 1098a4-5 [section C]), it follows that “the 
only proper conclusion of the ergon argument” is one that identifies the human good with 
 
6 However, other languages are better equipped. For example, in Latin one might use the translation 
“perfectus,” as we find in the translation of Grosseteste in Minio-Paluello 1974, and in French one might 
use the translation “achevé”—as we find in the translation of Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 2002. 
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an activity of the soul on the basis of “all” its proper virtues.7 Many interpreters—
including Keyt,8 Cooper,9 Roche,10 Curzer,11 Purinton,12 Müller,13 and Irwin14—give, in 
some form or other, the same argument as Ackrill.15 They all argue against a monistic 
 
7 Ackrill (1974) 1980, 27. In the same passage, he states: “Aristotle’s final conclusion adds what is usually 
taken to be a restriction to theoretical and contemplative thought, theoria, and to express therefore a narrow 
as opposed to an inclusive view of eudaimonia…. However, there is absolutely nothing in what precedes 
that would justify such a restriction.” 
8 Keyt 1983, 366 writes, “A second reason for favoring an inclusive rather than an exclusionary 
interpretation of the conclusion of the function argument is that the argument itself entails that the good for 
man is activity, not only in accordance with philosophical wisdom, but also in accordance with moral virtue 
and practical wisdom.” 
9 Cooper (1987) 1999, 222, discussing the ergon argument, writes, “And since (see 1098a4-5) our rational 
power is a complex thing, having several aspects and functions, the perfected exercise of our specific 
nature will require several activities, the activities of the virtues that perfect the several aspects and 
functions of our rational power. Thus, Aristotle’s own argument seems to require the conclusion that 
happiness is activity of complete virtue, i.e., activity of all the specifically human virtues, the ones 
belonging to our rational capacities.” Later Cooper (2003) 2004 and 2012 denies the inclusivist position but 
does not respond to the objection here articulated. 
10 Roche 1988, 183 writes, “The ergon argument reveals that the peculiar function of man must be an 
activity in accordance with reason. It does not show that the function of man lies in the specialized activity 
of contemplative reason. So if D [the definition of the human good] is interpreted as D1 [i.e. along monistic 
lines], it is not supported by Aristotle's argument.” Roche (2014, 238n.71) makes more or less the same 
argument. 
11 Curzer 1990, 430 writes, “On the intellectualist interpretation, the ‘best and most complete’ criterion 
does not follow from the ergon argument but is just awkwardly tacked on to the ergon argument’s 
conclusion.” 
12 Purinton 1998, 261 writes, “[T]here has been widespread acknowledgment of the force of Ackrill’s 
arguments against Hardie’s ‘intellectualist’ view that Aristotle means to claim in NE 1 that happiness is 
nothing but activity in accordance with σοφία: if one takes it that that is what Aristotle means to conclude 
from the function argument, one seems obliged to concede that this conclusion does not follow logically 
from the premises of the function argument.”   
13 Müller 2003, 532-533 writes, “Versteht man (b) [viz. the addition “if there are more virtues than one, on 
the basis of the best and most teleios virtue”] jedoch in Bezug auf die verschiedenen ethischen und 
dianoëtischen Einzeltugenden und somit τελειοτάτη ἀρετή als σοφία, wird (b) hingegen zu einem non 
sequitur, das sich nicht aus den Prämissen des ἔργον-Arguments ableiten läßt.” Müller 2003, 533n.41 also 
suggests that this critique, in a way, goes back to Hardie 1965, 280. 
14 Irwin 2012, 516-518 writes, “The conclusions we draw from the function argument will partly depend on 
what we say about the claim that the distinctively human function is ‘some sort of life of action of the 
having reason; of this one as obedient to reason, the other as having reason in thinking’ (1098a3-5).[…] the 
function argument, therefore, includes the disputed clause [1098a3-5]. The human good cannot consist 
exclusively in the inherently rational activity either of theoretical study or of practical reason; it also 
consists in the virtuous activity that harmonizes the obedient part with practical reason. And so the function 
argument supports a pluralist conception of happiness.” 
15 Even some scholars who think the definition ought to be interpreted monistically have conceded the force 
of this argument. For example, Kenny 1992, 29 writes, “Is the second half of the quoted sentence [i.e. “if 
there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most teleios, and moreover in a teleios life,” 
NE I 7, 1098a17-19] a conclusion of the function argument, or something further added? It seems more 
natural to take it as part of the conclusion, and this is one of the strong points of the inclusive interpretation 
of book I… It must be agreed, I think, that the second half of the sentence, if interpreted in the dominant 
sense, is not a conclusion of the function argument, but a separate, self-standing development.” See also 
Lawrence 2006, 59, discussed later in this section. Heinaman 1988, 36-37 concedes that a monistic reading 
cannot follow from the premises of the argument, but he considers this to be unproblematic because, on his 
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reading of the definition of the human good because they believe it cannot follow from 
the premises of the ergon argument. They are lead to this view because they tend to make 
three to four inter-related assumptions about the argument.  
First Assumption: the “good, that is, the well” of a human (1097b27) is the same 
thing as the human good (1098a16). Aristotle understands the “human good” (I 2, 
1094b7) to be the best good achievable in action (I 2, 1094a18-22 and I 4, 1095a16-17), 
and he suggests that we will perhaps acquire this if we grasp the ergon of a human. In 
section A he explains that this is so because “the good, that is, the well [to eu]” of 
anything with an ergon and an action is found in the ergon (NE I 7, 1097b25-28). Ackrill 
and others assume that “the good, that is, the well” of a human (at 1097b27) is the same 
thing as “the human good” (NE I 2, 1094b7; I 7, 1098a16), and this is not a ridiculous 
assumption to make. If “the good, that is, the well” of a human is the same as the human 
good, that would naturally explain why Aristotle thinks section A would elucidate the 
concept of the human good. 
Now when scholars criticize a monistic interpretation of the definition of the 
human good, they do not generally give interpretations of section A, but they often 
assume one not unlike that of Barney: “If an x qua x has as its function to Φ, then the 
good of an x qua x—its flourishing as an x—consists in Φ-ing well.”16 “The flourishing 
of an X, qua X” is her gloss on “the well” (to eu) in the phrase “the good, that is, the 
well” in section A, and she would seem to consider this to be the same as “the human 
good.” Lawrence similarly equates “the good, that is, the well” with “the human good” in 
his interpretation of section A: “Where the X is something with a function, the X-an 
good, i.e. the good of an X, consists in doing its function successfully or well.”17  
 
interpretation, the ergon argument defines eudaimonia and not the best kind of eudaimonia. (See also 
Cleemput 2006, 153.) However, this interpretation seems to conflict with Aristotle’s own characterization 
of the ergon argument as an attempt to define eudaimonia in the sense of the best good (NE I 7, 1097b22-
22). 
16 Barney 2008, 312. Roche 1988, 178 similarly gives an interpretation of section A on which “the good, 
that is, the well” of a human is equated with the human good: “[A]t NE 1097b25-28, Aristotle uses an 
inductive argument to show that ‘for all things that have an ergon and an action (praxis) the good and the 
well (to eu) for that thing is believed to be in the ergon.’ A flute-player, sculptor, or any artist, is said to 
realize his good (qua artist) in the performance of his work. And ‘so it would seem to be for man, if indeed 
he has an ergon.’”  
17 Lawrence 2009, 215. The emphasis is that of Lawrence. 
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Second Assumption: The additions “on the basis of the best virtue” and “in a 
complete life” are mere optional elucidations of the proper conclusion of the ergon 
argument. Aristotle pretty clearly identifies “activity of the rational part of the soul on the 
basis of virtue” with “the well” of a human at NE I 7, 1098a12 (in section D).  If one 
notes this and also makes the first assumption, one would naturally suppose that the only 
proper conclusion of the ergon argument is that the human good is “activity of the soul 
on the basis of virtue” (1098a16-17).  Indeed, scholars frequently express this thought by 
referring “activity of the soul on the basis of virtue” as the definition of the human 
good,18 and by reconstructing the ergon argument accordingly.19 They are then led to 
suppose that when Aristotle adds, “if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the 
best and most end-like” (1098a17-18) and “in an end-like [i.e. complete] life” (1098a18), 
he is not listing further requirements that something must meet in order to be the human 
good, but rather giving optional clarifications of what has been already stated in the 
proper conclusion of the ergon argument.20  
 
18 I here list a few examples. McDowell 1980, 366 writes, “At 1.7.9-16. 1097b22-1098a20, Aristotle 
exploits the thesis that the ergon of man consists in rational activity, and the conceptual connections 
between the notions of ergon, excellence, and activity, in order to reach the conclusion that eudaimonia, the 
good for man, is rational activity in accordance with excellence.” Cleemput 2006, 153 claims, “the ergon 
argument proper establishes that the human good consists in rational activity in accordance with 
excellence.” He then says that the rest of the definition is added in a “rider to the ergon argument” (153). 
Bush 2008, 64 writes, “The human function determines the human good, and so we find, ‘The human good 
turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.’” Scott 2015, 132 (cf. 169) writes, “The 
second half [of NE I 7] deploys the function argument, whose conclusion is that the human good consists in 
activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue.”  
19 Most reconstructions of the ergon argument explicitly present the proper conclusion of the ergon 
argument as “activity of the soul on the basis of virtue” (1098a16-17): see Glassen 1957, 320, Hutchinson 
1986, 55, Achtenberg 1991, 62-63, and Natali 2010, 317. Exceptions include Gomez-Lobo, Pakaluk and 
Gottlieb. However, the conclusion according to Gomez-Lobo 1989, 182 (“A human being will be a good 
human being if and only if he produces good instances of activity with reason”) or according to Pakaluk 
2005, 80 (“a good human being attains what is good for him”) does not seem to correspond to what we find 
in the text. Gottlieb 2009, 66-67 does list the full definition as the conclusion of the argument, but her 
reconstruction suggests that the two further additions are just optional clarifications. 
20 For example, Irwin 2012, 503 writes, “He [Aristotle] explains ‘in accord with virtue’ by adding that the 
relevant activity must be in accord with final virtue…” and later at 518 says, “In speaking of complete 
virtue Aristotle emphasizes the organic character of happiness and of the virtuous activity that achieves it” 
(emphasis added both times). In the first quotation Irwin presents what he takes to be the monist 
interpretation and in the second his own inclusivist interpretation. In both cases, he seems to think that one 
must understand “if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most teleios virtue” to be a 
kind of elucidation of “on the basis of virtue.” Similarly, Purinton (1998, 271) considers it “quite clear” that 
“the claim that happiness is activity in accordance with ‘the best and most perfect virtue’ [is] a mere 
reformulation of […] the claim that it is activity in accordance with virtue’” (emphasis added). 
 
 9 
 Third assumption: For an activity to count as the ergon of a human it must 
involve the activity of both parts of the soul that “have reason” (1098a3-4).21 In section 
C, Aristotle says that the human ergon is activity “of the part [of the soul] having reason” 
(1098a3-4), and he then clarifies that by “part having reason” he had in mind two parts: 
“one having reason in virtue of obeying reason, and another actually having reason and 
thinking” (1098a4-5).22 In NE I 13 he explains that the virtues of character are proper to 
the part that obeys reason, and the virtues of thought are proper to the part that has reason 
strictly speaking (1103a1-5). Ackrill and others have argued that since the human good is 
identified as an instance of the human ergon, and the human ergon is identified as 
activity of the part of the soul having reason, where this includes both parts that have 
reason, the human good must consequently include the activity of all the virtues—those 
of character as well as those of thought. Thus, either implicitly or explicitly Ackrill and 
others understand Aristotle’s characterization of the human ergon in section C to mean 
that an activity cannot count as an instance of the human ergon unless it involves activity 
of both parts of the soul that can be said to have reason.23  
Here we should also note that any inclusivist who made the second assumption 
but not the third would find themselves with an awkward result. For it would then be 
possible to interpret “activity of the soul on the basis of virtue” in a way that could be 
satisfied by two different types of activity: either virtuous activity of the part that has 
reason in itself, or virtuous activity that involves the part that obeys reason. Yet such a 
 
21 By using the language of “part” to describe Aristotle’s position, I of course do not mean to commit 
Aristotle to a Platonic notion of parts of the soul. Aristotle does not seem to think it is necessary for the 
practical philosopher to have a position on this issue (cf. NE I 13, 1102a28-32). 
22 Like most commentators, I take it that “the part that actually has reason and thinks” (NE I 7, 1098a4-5) 
includes both theoretical and practical reason. However, Joachim (1951) 1962, 50, and Bush 2008, 63 
propose that this part be identified exclusively with practical reason. I will not discuss their suggestion in 
depth, but see Auferheide 2015, 54 for a response to Bush, and see Kraut 1979, 469n.6 for a response to the 
suggestion of Joachim (1951) 1962, 50, apparently followed by Bush 2008, 63, that prakitkē [zoē] tis at 
1098a3 should be understood as “a certain practical life” (which involves exclusively practical activity) and 
not as “a certain active life” (which would include practical and/or theoretical activity).  
23 For Ackrill, Cooper and Irwin, see the quotations in the footnotes at the beginning of this section. Roche 
1988, 182-183 arguing similarly, writes, “Does the internal evidence suggest that D [the definition of the 
human good] should be interpreted along the lines of the intellectualist interpretation […]? The answer is 
clearly “No.” For there is nothing in the ergon argument which suggest that the human good should be 
confined to activities in accordance with contemplative virtue. On the contrary, the distinction made in A2 
[NE I 7, 1098a3-5] and B [NE I 7, 1098a12-14], suggests that the exercise of moral virtue is included in the 
ergon of man, hence, the human good.” 
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disjunctive interpretation would seem to be unacceptable since we are looking for the 
best—that is, teleologically highest—good. 
 Fourth Assumption: the key explanatory middle term of the argument inclines one 
to think that the human good would involve both practical and theoretical activity.  
In Posterior Analytics II 11, Aristotle gives examples of syllogisms with explanatory 
middle terms, one of which answers the question: “Why did the Athenians become 
involved in the Persian War?” The intended syllogism seems to run as follows: 
 
Athenians were the initial aggressors. 
Initial aggressors are warred upon. 
Therefore, the Athenians were warred upon.24 
 
“Initial aggressors” is here the explanatory middle term because it provides the reason for 
the conclusion. The Athenians became involved in the Persian War because they first 
invaded the Persian regional capital of Sardis (Post II 11, 94a37-b2). Now unlike this 
example, the ergon argument is composed of many premises and has more than one 
explanatory middle term. However, there is one key explanatory middle term, and this is 
the middle term that provides the direct link to the term “the human good” (τὸ 
ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν). 
 Interpreters have not generally articulated what exactly they take the key 
explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be, but they implicitly assume one that 
would make it unlikely for the human good to consist exclusively in theoretically wise 
activity. Many assume that the key explanatory middle term is (roughly) the “flourishing” 
of a human.25  On such an interpretation, an abbreviated form of Aristotle’s reasoning in 
the ergon argument would be as follows: 
 
The human good is the flourishing of a human. 
The flourishing of a human is the activity of the human soul on the basis of virtue. 
 
24 This is a slightly modified version of the syllogism found in Johansen 2012, 41. 
25 Barney 2008, in her interpretation of section A, effectively makes “the flourishing of a human” the key 
explanatory middle term of the ergon argument. The idea that the human good is the flourishing of a human 
also plays a central role in the neo-Aristotelian ethical theories of Foot 2001 and Kraut 2009. 
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Therefore, the human good is the activity of the human soul on the basis of virtue. 
 
Here “flourishing of a human” serves as an explanatory middle term, and since the term 
suggests the exercise of all distinctively human powers, it leads one to interpret “on the 
basis of virtue” as “on the basis of all the virtues.”26 
Gavin Lawrence takes a different key explanatory middle term to be a work in the 
ergon argument—the “success of a human”—but this also leads him to think that an 
inclusivist interpretation of the definition of the human good follows most naturally from 
the premises. Consider the following passage: 
 
[I]n favor of the comprehensive <reading of “best and most teleios virtue”>, one might compare 
eyesight: the good of the eye, or success in the eye, consists in performing its function, seeing, 
well, i.e. in accord with the excellence proper to seeing; and if there are several, then surely in 
accord with the best, i.e. most complete, set.  There are various defects of sight, and various 
aspects to its correctness—and one needs them all to enjoy perfect seeing.27  
 
Since the human good is the “success” of a human, it should likewise be an activity on 
the basis of “best, i.e. most complete, set” of virtues. Thus, Lawrence concedes that on 
his interpretation of the ergon argument, a monistic interpretation does not seem to 
follow from the premises. This is a surprising judgment on his part because he explicitly 
favors a selective reading of the phrase “the best and most teleios virtue,” mostly on the 
basis of evidence for monism elsewhere in the NE.28 
But how do these four assumptions relate to one another? As we just noted, the 
fourth assumption takes something like “the flourishing of a human” or “the success of a 
human” to be the same as the human good, and in order to find these terms in the text, 
 
26 Irwin 2012, 495 seems to think that “the realization of human nature and the human soul” is the 
explanatory middle term of the argument, and this of course leads him to think that the human good should 
be the actualization of all our distinctively human faculties. Scott 1999, 231 similarly claims, “the 
underlying premise of [the ergon argument] is that eudaimonia “must consist in some activity that 
expresses what we are.” However, unlike Irwin, Scott thinks that eudaimonia can consist in contemplation 
alone, and so is led to argue that there must two different human natures: nous and the composite. He does 
not attempt to explain how these two human natures interact. 
27 Lawrence 2006, 59. 
28 Lawrence 2006, 59.  He thinks that one could understand only retrospectively that the relevant phrase 
should be read “selectively”. Yet if this is the correct interpretation of the definition, it should of course be 
able to follow from the premises of the ergon argument, but Lawrence nowhere says how it could. 
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one would naturally understand them as glosses on “the well” in the phrase “the good, 
that is, the well” (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ, 1097b27), as both Lawrence and Barney do. This in 
turn leads one to identify the human good with “the good, that is, the well” of a 
human”—which is the first assumption. The first assumption then leads one to think that 
the proper conclusion of the ergon argument is that the human good is “activity of the 
soul on the basis of virtue,” and this in turn pushes one to understand the two additions 
(“on the basis of the best and most teleios virtue” and “in a teleios life”) as optional 
elucidations—which is the second assumption. Finally, the third assumption would also 
seem to be required by inclusivist reading of the definition, insofar as inclusivists reject 
the idea that the definition of the human good could be satisfied by two quite different 
goods: virtuous theoretical activity or virtuous practical activity.  
 
4. The Alternative Concept of Ergon 
 
If one wishes to argue that a monistic interpretation of the definition of the human 
good can indeed follow from the premises of the ergon argument, one must try to find a 
plausible interpretation of the argument that nevertheless allows one to reject the four 
assumptions (or at least a sufficient number of them). I believe that one can do this but it 
requires rejecting the widespread assumption that in the ergon argument Aristotle 
understands the ergon of an X to always be the proper activity of an X. Instead, we 
should maintain that in NE I 7 the ergon of an X is taken to be an activity in some cases 
but a product (beyond the activity) in others, in accordance with the sort of the thing that 
the X is. Thus, while the ergon of the flautist is a performance, the ergon of a sculptor is 
not sculpting, but a sculpture. And while the ergon of a human is an activity of living, the 
ergon of a housebuilder is not housebuilding, but a house. Elsewhere I have argued at 
length that Aristotle employs this concept of an ergon in Nicomachean Ethics I 7.29  
However, I will here just give two brief reasons to think the interpretation is 
correct. First, this alternative concept is required if one thinks, as many do and as 
 
29 See Baker 2015. I should also perhaps note that the language of “product” is not perfect since in English 
it does not seem inappropriate to speak of some proper activities (like singing or dancing) as products. 
However, the key thought is just that for some things the ergon is a proper activity while for others it is 
something external beyond the proper activity. 
 
 13 
Eudemian Ethics II 1 explicitly states, that the ergon of an X is the end for the sake of 
which an X, as an X, exists (1219a8). This is because there is overwhelming evidence 
that while Aristotle considers some proper activities to be ends, he considers others not to 
be ends, but essentially means-to-ends (cf. Meta Θ 6, 1048b18-35). These latter activities 
have an internal reason to stop and this is the essential ordering to their end. Thus, 
sculpting is a means-to-an-end and an individual instance of sculpting naturally comes to 
a stop when its end—the sculpture—is produced. Similarly, housebuilding is a means-to-
an-end and an individual instance of housebuilding naturally comes to a stop when its 
end—the house—is produced. Aristotle would also seem to subscribe to this distinction 
in the NE (cf. I 1, 1094a1-6 and X 4, 1174a19-23).30 Thus, if he thinks that the ergon of 
an X is the end of an X, as an X, he should also subscribe to the alternative concept of an 
ergon.31  
Second, only if one assumes that Aristotle is using this alternative concept in NE I 
7 can Aristotle’s reasoning in the passage be what it ought to be. The conclusion of the 
ergon argument is a definition of the “human good” (1098a16), and this quasi-technical 
term was introduced at NE I 2, 1094b7 as a label for the best good achievable in action by 
humans. There Aristotle explained that the best achievable good is something that we 
rationally-desire (βουλόμεθα) for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and 
it is something for whose sake we choose all other things (I 2, 1094a18-22).32 Thus, if we 
are to remain faithful to Aristotle’s own way of thinking about the human good, we must 
understand him to be arriving at his definition of the human good precisely because this 
is the best achievement of a human. Thus, the key explanatory middle term of the ergon 
argument should be “best achievement of a human.”  
Only the alternative concept of an ergon allows this to be so, and this is because it 
allows the claim of section A to be this:  
 
30 Anagnostopoulos 2017 also argues that even though the distinction in Physics III 1 (between the activity 
of something complete and the activity of something incomplete) is more fundamental than the distinction 
in Metaphysics Θ 6 (between complete and incomplete activities), this does not undermine the latter 
distinction’s “applicability in certain contexts, especially ethical contexts” (208). 
31 See Baker 2015, 246-247. 
32 It is also worth noting that Aristotle understands this teleological ordering to be independent of any 
individual human psychology. On this point, note that at the very beginning of the ethics, Aristotle says that 
when an activity issues in a work beyond that activity, as sculpting issues in a sculpture beyond the activity 




For anything with an ergon and an action, the good in the sense of the excellent achievement 
(τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ) is found in its ergon. (NE I 7, 1097b25-28) 
 
The basic thought here is: For anything that has an ergon and an action, the good in the 
sense of the excellent achievement is its ergon achieved well. Thus, for a sculptor, the 
good in the sense of the excellent achievement is the sculpture achieved well (i.e. an 
excellent sculpture). Such a claim is obviously relevant to determining the best 
achievement of a sculptor since the best achievement of a sculptor will be the 
superlatively excellent achievement of a sculptor. Similarly, the best achievement of a 
human will be a superlatively excellent achievement of a human—that is, the excellent 
achievement of a human with any better-making features that there may be.  
Here it is worth appreciating this point by way of contrast. For if we assume that 
the ergon of an X is always the proper activity of an X, then the reasoning of section A 
(as interpreted above) would not be relevant for determining the best achievement of an 
X. This is because Aristotle makes the claim of section A with respect to “a flautist, a 
sculptor, every craftsman and generally anything with an ergon and an action” (NE I 7, 
1097b26); yet the best achievement of a sculptor is clearly not a certain instance of 
sculpting well but rather a certain excellent sculpture (cf. NE I 1, 1094a5-6). Thus, in 
order for section A to contain the rationale that it ought to contain, Aristotle needs to be 
employing the alternative concept of an ergon.33 
  
5. Two Ways of Reading the Full Definition of the Human Good in Relation to the 
Premises of the Ergon Argument 
 
 To help us appreciate the interpretation of the ergon argument that I offer in the 
next section, I here draw a distinction between two different ways of thinking about the 
full definition of the human good in section F. I divide this last section of the ergon 
argument into three parts—a preliminary definition and two additions: 
 
 
33 See Baker 2015, 261-263. 
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[Prelim. Def.] The human good turns out to be activity of the <rational part of the human> soul 
on the basis of virtue (1098a16-17).   
 




[Addition 2]  …moreover, in a teleios life. (1098a18)  
 
Now in giving the two additions to his preliminary definition of the human good is 
Aristotle (1) listing additional criteria that something must meet if it is to be the human 
good or is he (2) merely clarifying what criteria are already implicit in his preliminary 
definition?  I call option (1) the additional criteria view, and I call option (2) the implicit 
criteria view.  Those who argue that a monistic reading of the definition of the human 
good cannot follow from the premises of the argument almost inevitably subscribe to the 
implicit criteria view (as I mentioned above). Those who think that a monistic reading 
can indeed follow from the premises can most straightforwardly make their case by 
subscribing to the additional criteria view.34 In what follows I shall offer an interpretation 
of section A that allows one to reconstruct the ergon argument in a way that is compatible 
with the additional criteria view.35 
 
6. The Ergon Argument and the Additional Criteria View 
 
My proposed interpretation of section A is compatible with both the implicit 
criteria view and the additional criteria view: “If anything has an ergon and an action, the 
excellent achievement of that thing (as such) is its ergon achieved excellently/well.”   
To make it consistent with the implicit criteria view, one should equate “the excellent 
achievement” of a human with the best achievement of a human (that is, the human 
 
34 See Baker 2015, 259-260 for a reconstruction of the ergon argument in premise-conclusion format that is 
compatible with the additional criteria view. 
35 Two clarifications are perhaps in order. First, I am not claiming that every interpretation of the ergon 
argument must neatly fall into one of these two views. And second, I am not making any claims about 
which view must be adopted by monists or inclusivists. 
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good). To make it consistent with the additional criteria view, one should not equate the 
two. On this latter reading, we can understand Aristotle to be arriving at his full definition 
of the human good, by first identifying the class of thing that the human good falls under, 
and then by systematically listing various features that the human good would need to 
possess in order to be the best achievement of a human.   
The method seems reasonable.  If we want to determine the best achievement of 
any given thing, it makes sense to determine what the proper achievement (or proper 
work) of that thing is, and this is the ergon of that thing.  One should then list whatever 
features are necessary for that proper achievement to be as good as possible. Since the 
human good is the best achievement of a human, Aristotle first determines the proper 
achievement (or proper work) of a human as “active life” of the part of the human soul 
having reason (1098a3-4) by which he means “an activity of the <human> soul on the 
basis of reason or not without reason” (1098a7-8; cf. 13-14).   He then lists relevant 
features that serve to narrow in on what the best achievement of a human is: first, “on the 
basis of virtue” (1098a17) but then, “if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the 
best and most teleios virtue” (1098a17-18) and finally, “in a teleios life” (1098a18).  Here 
the last two additions are not optional (even if valuable) elucidations of the preliminary 
definition, as they are on the implicit criteria view, but additional criteria that Aristotle 
must add if he is to properly define the human good as the best achievement of a human 
being.  
One could employ the same method in order to determine what, for Aristotle, is the 
best achievement of a poet.  A poet’s proper achievement will be a poem (cf. NE IX 9, 
1167b33-1168a2). Yet in order for a poem to be the best achievement of a poet, further 
features will need to be added: it will need to be achieved well, that is, on the basis of the 
virtue proper to a poet, and also, if there are more genres of poetry than one—which there 
are since there is epic, tragedy, comedy, lyric, etc.—it will need to be an excellent poem 
of the best genre. Indeed Aristotle appears to identify the best poetic genre as tragedy 
when he argues in Poetics 26 that tragedy is a better genre than epic.  Thus, the best 
achievement of a poet will be: “a poem achieved on the basis of poetic virtue, and if there 
are more genres than one, such a poem of the best genre.”  And so while an excellent 
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poem in any genre counts as an excellent achievement of a poet, only an excellent 
tragedy could count as the best achievement of a poet. 
One could likewise use this method to determine what, for Aristotle, would be the 
best achievement of a sculptor, to use an example from the ergon argument (NE I 7, 
1097b25). The proper achievement of a sculptor will be a sculpture, but in order for it to 
be the best achievement of a sculptor, further features must be added: it will need to be 
achieved well, that is, on the basis of the virtue proper to a sculptor (cf. NE VI 7, 1141a9-
12), but it also will need to have any possible “better-making” features. For example, in 
order to be the best achievement of a sculptor, an excellent sculpture would need to be of 
the most excellent subject matter: “equally in the case of painting, one might be a good 
imitator [mimētēs] but would nevertheless not be praised if one should not set as one’s 
aim to imitate [mimeisthai] the noblest things [to kallista]” (MM I 19, 1190a30-32). 
Because painting and sculpture are imitative arts their value will largely derive from what 
they imitate; thus, while there can be an excellent sculpture of a mouse, it will not be as 
good as an excellent sculpture of a human.36 Moreover, the best sculpture will need to be 
constructed out of optimal material because “to the extent that the material is prepared 
prepared, the finer the work of the art necessarily is” (Pol VII 4, 1326a1-3; cf. NE I 10, 
1101a3-6). An excellent sculpture made out of mud or clay is just not as good as an 
excellent sculpture made out of marble or bronze.37 The best achievement of a sculptor, 
then, will be a sculpture achieved on the basis of virtue, and if there is more than one 
 
36 On this point, see Parts of Animals I 5, where in the course of arguing that one should study not only the 
celestial bodies but also the less noble terrestrial animals, Aristotle writes, “For even among the animals 
that are not pleasant for sense to contemplate, yet the nature fashioning them [ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις] 
gives extraordinary pleasures to those who are capable of discovering their causes and are naturally 
inclined to philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange [ἄτοπον] and contrary to reason [παράλογον] if we 
enjoy contemplating images of them, because we simultaneously contemplate the fashioning art [τὴν 
δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην] of e.g. the painter or sculptor, and we do not love more the contemplation of the 
things themselves framed by nature, at least insofar as we are able to discern the causes” (645a7-15). (I 
translate the Greek in Louis 1956.) In this passage Aristotle not only takes it for granted that sculpture is a 
mimetic art (PA I 5, 645a13), but also assumes that one would naturally love and enjoy contemplating the 
thing imitated, which is fashioned by nature, more than its imitation, which is fashioned by art (PA I 5, 
645a10-15). A reasonable explanation for this latter claim is that Aristotle understands the value of a 
mimetic artwork to derive largely from the value of its subject matter. Similarly, one should note, Aristotle 
takes the value of a science to derive primarily from the value of its subject matter (cf. NE VI 7 and DA I 
1). 
37 Yet it is worth clarifying that Aristotle would also presumably think that the material of a sculpture must 
suit the artistic goal of that sculpture (cf. Phys II 9, 200a30-b8). 
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subject matter, concerning the noblest subject matter, and moreover, constructed out of 
the best material. 
 I give these examples in order to help us appreciate how Aristotle’s reasoning in 
the ergon argument could very well terminate in a definition that picks out a single type 
of virtuous activity—namely, activity on the basis of sophia—as the human good. The 
idea is that the addition “if there is more than one virtue, on the basis of the best and most 
teleios virtue” serves as a further condition that a virtuous activity would need meet in 
order to qualify as the best achievement of a human. Similarly, the addition “if there is 
more than one genre, of the best genre” serves as a further condition that an excellent 
poem would need to meet in order to qualify as the best achievement of a poet, and the 
addition “if there is more than one subject matter, concerning the noblest subject matter” 
serves as a further condition that an excellent sculpture would need to meet in order to 
qualify as the best achievement of a sculptor. 
 
7. Alternatives to the Assumptions Behind the Objection 
 
I now show why the interpretation of the argument here proposed can reject each 
assumption earlier listed in section 3.  
Alternative to the First Assumption: “the good, that is, the well” of a human 
(1097b27) is not the same as the human good. The former is roughly related to the latter 
as genus to species. “The good, that is, the well” of a human is the excellent achievement 
of a human, while the human good is a certain excellent achievement of a human, 
namely, the best achievement of a human. The best achievement of a human possesses 
certain better-making features that an excellent achievement of a human need not 
possess. As Aristotle notes in Nicomachean Ethics II 4, one “excellent achievement” (to 
eu) can be better than another (1105a10). 
Alternative to the Second Assumption:  The additional criteria view, not the 
implicit criteria view, is correct. The best achievement (τὸ ἄριστον, NE I 2, 1094a22) of a 
human can be something better than the excellent achievement (τὸ εὖ, NE I 7, 1097b27) 
of a human, and consequently the two last additions (“if there is more than one virtue, on 
the basis of the best and most teleios” and “in a teleios life”) serve to mark off the best 
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achievement from the merely excellent one. They are not just optional elucidations of 
“activity of the soul on the basis of virtue,” but further requirements that an activity must 
meet if it is to count as the human good.38 Similarly, the addition “of the best genre” is 
not just an optional elucidation of “poem achieved on the basis of poetic virtue” but a 
further requirement that a poem must meet if it is to count as the best achievement of a 
poet. And the addition “of the best subject matter” is not just an optional elucidation of 
“sculpture achieved on the basis of the virtue of a sculptor” but a further requirement that 
a sculpture must meet if it is to count as the best achievement of a sculptor. 
Alternative to the Third Assumption: For an activity to count as the ergon of a 
human it need not involve the activity of both parts of the soul that are said to “have 
reason” (NE I 7, 1098a3-4) With regard to the interpretation of section C, even though 
the ergon of a human being is specified as activity of the part of the human soul having 
reason, where this includes both activity of the part that has reason strictly speaking and 
activity of the part that has reason as obeying reason, I take it that Aristotle would 
consider theoretical activity, which is an activity of just the part of that has reason strictly 
speaking, to be a genuine instance of the human ergon—even though such an activity is 
separated from the compound of soul and body (cf. NE X 8, 1178a22) and thus need not 
involve any activity of the obedient part of the soul.39 To use our earlier analogy, even 
though the ergon of poet may be specified as a poem, where poems include tragedy, 
comedy, lyric, etc., Aristotle would consider just a tragedy on its own to be a genuine 
instance of the poet’s ergon.  It is a genuine instance of the poet’s ergon even though it is 
not also a lyric or a comedy.  Thus, it is not at all implausible that when Aristotle gives 
Addition 1 he means to single out a certain activity of the part of the soul that has reason 
strictly speaking as the best achievement of a human. Likewise, when one attaches the 
 
38 Aquinas 1969, 56, I.10.144-152 similarly explains the addition “on the basis of the best and most teleios 
virtue” by saying “happiness [felicitas] is not only the good of man but the best good of man.” Though it is 
unclear to me how Aquinas understands the premises of the ergon argument, his statement does seem to 
commit him to what I have called the additional criteria view. 
39 Commenting on Aristotle’s claim at NE X 8, 1178a22 that “the virtue of the intellect” (by which 
Aristotle clearly means theoretical virtue) is “separated” from the compound, Reeve (2014, 348) writes, 
“Theoretical wisdom is separate from the body and the other psychic elements […] because it is the virtue 
of something separate from them.” For discussion of the separability of intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima, 
see Miller 2012 and Cohoe 2013. 
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addition “if there are more genres than one, of the best genre,” one would be singling out 
a tragedy or group of tragedies as the best achievement of a poet.   
Alternative to the Fourth Assumption: the key explanatory middle term of the 
argument does not incline one to think that the human good involves both practical and 
theoretical activity.  If we assume that the key explanatory middle term of the ergon 
argument is “the best achievement of a human” there is no obvious pressure to suppose 
that the human good involves exercise of all our human capacities. Similarly, I take it, the 
term “best achievement of a poet” need not incline one to think that such a poetic 
achievement must involve all genres. Moreover, we can plausibly interpret the ergon 
argument as having “the best achievement of a human” as its key explanatory middle 
term precisely because we suppose Aristotle to be employing the alternative concept of 
an ergon (on which see section 4 above). 
 
8. Two Clarifications 
 
I have now given reasons to think that it is both possible and plausible that a 
monistic reading of the definition of the human good follows from the premises of the 





8.1 The Human Ergon in the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics 
 
My first clarification is that even if you accept my proposed interpretation of the 
argument, that does not itself ensure a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the 
human good. This is because it is only retrospectively that one can be confident that “the 
best and most teleios virtue” refers to a single virtue to the exclusion of others.40  This is 
in turn because it is only retrospectively that we can know that all the virtues—both 
practical and theoretical—do not unite to form a super ‘whole’ virtue, whose exercise 
somehow involves the other virtues. Such a virtue would be the best and most teleios 
virtue precisely because the part exists for the sake of the whole and thus the whole is 
better than the part (Pol I 2, 1253a18–29; cf. Meta Z 10, 1034b28–32). 
Aristotle apparently believed there was such a super virtue when he wrote the 
Eudemian Ethics, and that virtue is “kalokagathia” (“nobility-and-goodness”). Consider 
the following lines from EE VIII 3: 
 
About each virtue individually we have earlier spoken. Now since we have distinguished their 
powers separately, we must also describe carefully the virtue that [arises] out of these, which we 
have already been calling ‘nobility-and-goodness’ [kalokagathia]. That he who truly deserves this 
denomination must have the individual [kata meros] virtues is clear; it cannot be otherwise with 
other things either, for no one is healthy in his entire body and yet healthy in no part of it, but the 
most numerous and important parts, if not all, must be in the same condition as the whole. 
(1248b8-16)41 
 
Aristotle here assumes that there is a virtue that arises out of the individual virtues, of 
which he had “earlier spoken.” Aristotle discussed the intellectual virtues in EE V [=NE 
VI], and so they too must presumably be included.42 He identifies this virtue as 
 
40 See Baker forthcoming in which I use Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic 
reference in order to explain how the phrase “best and most teleios virtue” might refer to a specific virtue, 
even though Aristotle (in NE I 7) is not using the phrase to refer to a specific virtue. 
41 This translation is based on that of Solomon in Barnes 1995. 
42 Likewise, Décarie 2007, 272n.74, commenting on 1249a16-17, speaks of kalogathia as “la vertu qui 
comprend toutes les autres (y compris les vertus intellectuelles) ainsi que l’indiquaient le début du chapitre 
[1248b8-16] et les passages pertinents de II 1.” Here are two further reasons to think that kalokagathia 
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kalokagathia, which I translate literally as “nobility-and-goodness.” This term, which is 
here being elevated for philosophical use, suggests nobility in an aristocratic sense: that 
is, the advantages of wealth, good birth, a well-rounded education, and access to leisure 
time. Thus, in an Aristotelian context it naturally suggests someone who is able both to 
rule themselves and others (on the basis of character virtue and practical wisdom) but 
also to use their leisure time well (on the basis of theoretical virtue). By claiming that 
“nobility-and-goodness” is the whole virtue of which the individual virtues are the parts 
(EE VIII 3, 1248b8-11),43 and by explicitly stating a little later in the same chapter that 
“nobility-and-goodness is teleios virtue” (1249a16-17), Aristotle apparently identifies the 
referent of “teleios virtue” in the definition of happiness at EE II 1, 1219a39. 
Consequently, Aristotle in the EE does indeed seem to think that the best good is an 
activity on the basis of all the human virtues, including the virtues of the intellect. 
However, that is not because it is an activity on the basis of all the virtues, but rather 
because it is an activity on the basis of a single (most) teleios virtue that nevertheless 
includes all the others.44   
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seems to think that it is possible for one 
virtue to be composed out of many virtues. In NE V (=EE IV) 1 he explains that whole 
character virtue is composed out of all the virtues of character, and that when it is 
exercised towards another (πρὸς ἔτερον) it is general-justice, and moreover that 
particular-justice is related to general-justice as part to whole (NE V [=EE IV] 1-2, 
1130a9-14). However, the NE does not seem to recognize any whole virtue that is 
composed out of all virtues, both practical and theoretical. Instead, the book’s final 
chapters, NE X 6-8, present a sort of rivalry between the best practical virtue (which 
seems to be general-justice, presumably conjoined with legislative phronesis; cf. NE V 
 
includes the intellectual virtues. First, Aristotle implies that nobility-and-goodness is composed out of all 
the virtues or all the most important virtues (EE VIII 3, 1248b11-16) and it is clear that sophia is one of the 
most important virtues, if not the most important virtue.  Second, the conjunction of three extremely 
plausible claims yields this conclusion: (1) eudaimonia is activity “on the basis of teleios virtue” (EE II 1, 
1219a38-39), (2) teleios virtue is the single virtue of nobility-and-goodness (EE VIII 3, 1249a16-17), and 
(3) the exercise of the theoretical virtues is part of eudaimonia (cf. EE VIII 3, 1249b9-25).   
43 Note also the use of kata meros, which I imperfectly translate as “individual,” at EE VIII 3, 1248b8 and 
b12. 
44 Aristotle in the Politics seems to express a similar view: “the good man, we say, is [good] on the basis of 
a single virtue, the teleios one” (III 4, 1276b33-34, my emphasis). Similarly, Plato in the Republic speaks 
of the virtue of a human being as justice (e.g. I, 353e7-8), which he seems to understand as a single virtue. 
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[=EE IV] 1, 1129b25-27 and VI [=EE V] 1141b25) and the best theoretical virtue (which 
is clearly sophia). The activity of the best practical virtue is for the sake of the activity of 
the unqualifiedly best virtue (which is sophia), in evidence of which Aristotle notes, for 
example, that in practical virtuous activity we aim “to a greater or lesser extent to gain 
something beyond the action” (NE X 7, 1177b2-3). Here there is no textual reason to 
think that the best practical virtue forms a part of the unqualifiedly best virtue. Instead, 
Aristotle explicitly says that the virtue of the theoretical intellect is “separated”  
(κεχωρισμένη, ΝΕ X 8, 1178a22) from the virtue of the compound. 
Noting this dissimilarity between the NE and the EE also puts us in a position to 
diffuse two potential problems. First, at NE VI (=EE V) 12, 1144a6-7 we read: 
“Moreover, the ergon is fulfilled [ἀποτελεῖται] on the basis of phronesis and character 
virtue.” According to Irwin, this passage “confirms the claim in I 7 that happiness has to 
include the harmony of the non-rational but obedient part with the inherently rational 
part.”45 Now I think that when read in context this elliptical line does not force upon one 
the conclusion, implicitly drawn by Irwin, that the second assumption mentioned above is 
true, namely that any full instance of the human ergon must involve both the activity of 
the part of the soul that obeys reason and the activity of the part that actually has reason 
and thinks.46 However, even if one did think this, one should be wary of imposing this 
conclusion on the NE ergon argument. That is because NE VI (=EE V) is a book common 
to both the NE and the EE, and as a growing scholarly consensus maintains, the common 
books were originally written for inclusion in the EE.47 Moreover, parts of the common 
books seem to have been imperfectly revised for their inclusion in the NE, and thus 
 
45 Irwin 2012, 519. Roche 1988, 182 also makes this argument. 
46 NE VI (=EE V) 12 begins by noting several reasons one might have for thinking that being happy 
(eudaimon) does not require either sophia or phronesis. At 1143b21-28 Aristotle asks why we need 
phronesis if it makes the person with character virtue no more likely to do good and just actions. Because 
the passage quoted above (1144a6-7) is, I take it, part of his answer to this question, there is good reason to 
think that “the ergon” at 1144a6 should be glossed not just as “the human ergon” but more particularly as 
“the human practical ergon.” On this reading, Aristotle would be answering his earlier worry by responding 
that yes, one does also need phronesis because “the [human practical] ergon is fulfilled on the basis of 
phronesis and character virtue: for virtue makes the goal correct, and phronesis makes the means to this 
goal correct” (1144a6-9). This sort of reading does make the text somewhat elliptical, and I acknowledge 
that Aristotle elsewhere shows himself capable of qualifying what sort of ergon he has in mind (e.g. NE VI 
2, 1139a27-29). However, the text is elliptical even on an inclusivist reading such as Irwin’s. This is 
because on Irwin’s reading, theoretical activity is also part of the human ergon, in which case Aristotle 
should really be saying that the ergon is achieved on the basis of phronesis, character virtue, and sophia. 
47 See e.g. Kraut 1997, 129-130 and 2002, 16-19 for an articulation of this view. 
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sometimes retain some EE views that are not fully compatible with those in the NE.48 
Given what we earlier noted about the EE’s view of the best good, i.e. that happiness is 
an activity of a super virtue that somehow involves all the other virtues, one could 
reasonably argue that NE VI (=EE V) 12, 1144a6-7 is one such imperfectly revised 
passage.  
Second, Ackrill argued that since the definition of happiness at EE II 1 should be 
interpreted inclusively, we should likewise interpret the definition of the human good at 
NE I 7. According to the EE, “happiness would be the activity of a teleios life on the 
basis of teleios virtue” (II 1, 1219a38-39), and Ackrill claimed that when the EE ergon 
argument speaks of “teleios virtue” Aristotle means “complete virtue,” in the sense of “all 
virtues.”49  However, there is good reason to question this. Just a few lines earlier in EE II 
1, Aristotle explains what he has in mind by “teleios virtue” by noting that “virtue may be 
whole or it may be a part” (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον, 1219a37). Elsewhere Aristotle 
takes it to be clear that the whole is ontologically prior to its parts (e.g. Pol I 2, 1253a20), 
and so it is not plausible to understand teleios virtue as the complete collection of 
individual virtues.50 Instead, we should expect teleios virtue to be a single whole virtue 
that is ontologically prior to the individual virtues, which it has as parts. And as we have 
already seen, the EE goes on to identify “teleios virtue” as nobility-and-goodness—a 
whole virtue that is composed out of all the individual virtues (EE VIII 3, 1249a16-17).51 
 
48 Lorenz 2009, for example, argues for an imperfect Nicomachean revision of NE VII (=EE VI). See also 
Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 2002, who give good reasons to think that NE VI (=EE V) is an imperfect 
Nicomachean revision. Like these authors, I think we should not entirely dismiss the evidence from the 
common books when interpreting the doctrines of the NE, but that we should be circumspect in the way 
that we use that evidence. 
49 Ackrill 1980, 27. 
50 However, since ontological priority only seems to hold for natural wholes and not for artifacts (cf. 
perhaps Top VI 13, 150a33-36), one might think the priority does not hold for whole virtue. A full 
discussion of this point falls outside the scope of this paper, but I will note that virtue does seem to be 
natural insofar as it is the perfection (teleiōsis) of our nature, and insofar as we have a natural inclination to 
acquire it (NE I 7, 1098a15; II 1, 1103a25). Cf. Leunissen 2015. Moreover, Aristotle seems to think that the 
individual character virtues cannot exist apart from one another or from phronesis (NE VI [=EE V] 13, 
1144b30-1145a2), and so here too there seems to be an ontological priority of whole character virtue (NE V 
[=EE IV] 1130a11-13). 
51 Thus, Aristotle would identify teleios virtue kalokagathia because this virtue is teleologically highest—
since the part exists for the sake of the whole. (On this reading, the different ways of being teleios as listed 
in Metaphysics Δ 16 are not mutually exclusive.) Though I will not discuss this point here, I believe 
Aristotle’s use of teleios in the phrase “teleios life” (at EE II 1, 1219a38-39 and NE I 7, 1098a18) can also 
be interpreted teleologically for the same reason. The word then means something like “perfect” (not 
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However, Ackrill and others do not maintain that the human good is an activity on the 
basis of all the virtues because there is some super whole virtue.52 Consequently, their 
inclusivist reasoning finds no precedent in the EE.53 
 
8.2 Eudaimonia and The Human Good 
 
My second clarification is that even if you accept a monistic reading of the 
definition of the human good, that does not require you to be a monist about eudaimonia 
or even about the human good itself. (What I am about to say I can only offer as a 
sketch.) 
Let us begin by considering the remarks that Aristotle makes about eudaimonia in 
the last chapters of the NE. By means of various arguments, which we will not go 
through, Aristotle concludes that the contemplative life is the happiest, while the political 
life is happy
 
only in a secondary way (X 8, 1178a9).54 Likewise, the activity of 
theoretical wisdom is the primary form of human eudaimonia (cf. X 7, 1177a12-b26), 
while the activity of the best practical virtue, which I take to be the activity of general 
justice, seems to be only a secondary form of human eudaimonia (cf. X 8, 1178a20-22). 
 
“complete”), though being “complete” is one way of being “perfect.” On this interpretation, the French 
“achevé,” as used by Gauthier and Jolif (1970), seems apt. 
52 The exception may be Irwin 2012, 518, who in arguing for his inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle’s 
definition of the human good in NE I 7, writes: “But if we understand completeness by reference to the 
relation between a whole and its parts, Aristotle’s claim about the most complete end and the most 
complete virtue are reasonable. His preference for the singular (‘complete virtue’) over the plural (‘all the 
virtues’) is reasonable in the light of his conception of wholes. Even if happiness includes all virtuous 
activities, acting for the sake of happiness is an integrated activity that combines virtuous activities in an 
organized way of life.” Here Irwin perhaps commits himself to the view that in the NE there is a single 
“whole” virtue of which the other virtues are “parts.” Though he offers no direct textual evidence that there 
is such a virtue, one could cite NE VI (=EE V) 12, 1144a5 where Aristotle seems to suggest there exists a 
“whole virtue” of which sophia is a part. Given the interpretation that I have advanced, I suspect that either 
Aristotle is here speaking very loosely or that this is an EE passage that was imperfectly revised for its 
inclusion in the NE.  
53 Is the view that I discern in the EE a version of monism or inclusivism? I think the most reasonable 
answer is: it is not obvious. The reason is that the view does not seem to easily fit into the terms of the 
traditional debate. On the one hand, it seems to be a version of monism insofar as happiness is the activity 
of a single virtue—and thus Charles 2015, 62, who briefly considers this sort of position in the abstract, 
considers it a form of monism. On the other hand, it seems to be a version of inclusivism insofar as 
happiness involves the activity of all the virtues—and thus Irwin 2012, 518, who comes very close to 
attributing such a view to the NE, seems to consider it a form of inclusivism. 
54 The word “happy” is actually omitted at NE X 8, 1178a9, but it seems like it should be supplied from the 
previous line, as Lear 2004, 176n.2 suggests. Yet is perhaps defensible to supply “happiest” instead, as 
Broadie 1991, 438n.72 contends. 
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Taken at face value, these remarks suggest that Aristotle is neither a monistic nor an 
inclusivist about eudaimonia.  On the one hand, Aristotle is not an inclusivist about 
eudaimonia because he does not claim that the best good is a certain conjunction of 
practical and theoretical activity.55  He could have easily said this, as he seems to in the 
last chapters of the EE, but he does not. On the other hand, he does not seem to be a 
monist because he clearly claims that the activity of general justice is a genuine case of 
eudaimonia, though it has less the character of eudaimonia than the activity of theoretical 
wisdom.  He seems to be instead what I will call a “gradationist.”  Such an interpretation 
is, I believe, confirmed by Aristotle’s claim that the God’s eudaimonia is “superior in 
blessedness” to our own (X 8, 1178b22, cf. I 10, 1101a19-21 and Meta Λ 7, 1072b24-
26). We thus have in the NE at least three things that are called eudaimonia, and they can 
be ranked in relation to one another: the contemplative activity of God is better than the 
life-long human activity of theoretical wisdom, which is in turn better than the life-long 
human activity of general justice. Moreover, Aristotle claims that human activities have 
the character of eudaimonia only to the degree that they are akin to God’s activity (NE X 
8, 1178b22-24; cf. Cael II 12). God’s activity is then the primary case of happiness, and 
any other activity will be called “happiness” to the extent that it relevantly approximates 
that activity.56 
But does this mean that Aristotle is a gradationist about the human good?  I think 
that one can defensibly answer “yes” or “no.” 
If one were to answer “no,” then one would of course need to pry apart what it is 
to be the human good and what it is to be eudaimonia.  This is exegetically possible and 
 
55 I am ignoring the possibility that Aristotle is a “total-inclusivist”—that is, someone who believes that 
happiness consists in virtuous activity as well as in other goods. Such a position can be subdivided into 
those who think that virtuous activity is the “principle component of happiness” (Broadie, 2002, 286), and 
those who think that happiness is alone virtuous activity but that such activity is partly constituted by goods 
such as health (e.g. Crisp 1994). See Heinamen 2007 for this distinction as well as for powerful arguments 
that happiness in the NE is always understood as an activity to the exclusion of other goods. 
56 In articulating this gradationist reading of eudaimonia, I take myself to be developing thoughts already 
defended in the literature. For example, Charles 1999 and 2015 argues that the human activity of theoretical 
wisdom is the central (or paradigm) case of happiness, but that there are other instances as well. Scott 1999 
and Bush 2008 are what Bush calls “dualists” since they both acknowledge two kinds of eudaimonia in the 
NE: virtuous practical activity and virtuous contemplative activity. Lear 2004 understands virtuous 
contemplative activity to be in some sense a paradigm for other virtuous human activity, but she argues that 
a strict teleological conception of the human good requires monism. Long 2012 advances a gradationist 
view, making the activity of God the primary case of eudaimonia, but he considers Aristotle’s overall 
argument in the NE to be “structurally flawed” (113). Bush 2008, Charles 2015 and Long 2012 all agree 
with Lear in different ways, but none of them seems to wrestle with her teleological arguments for monism. 
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even desirable.  It is possible because Aristotle would seem to use the phrase “the human 
good” as a special label for the best, i.e. teleologically highest, good achievable in action 
by human beings (I 2, 1094b7). Yet when Aristotle identifies eudaimonia with the best 
and most teleios end (I 7, 1097a34), he does not use a deductively valid argument but an 
“inference from a sign.”57  He thus leaves it open how exactly we should think of the 
relationship of the human good and eudaimonia.   
This interpretation seems to be desirable because eudaimonia and the human good 
are not coextensive.  First, the gods possess eudaimonia, but this is far superior to what 
humans achieve in action, and so should not be equated with the human good (Meta Λ 7, 
1072b24-26; cf. NE X 8, 1178b22-23, and I 10, 1101a19-21). Second, the activity of 
general justice is called eudaimonia (NE X 8, 1178a21-22) but there is good reason to 
think that it cannot be the best thing achievable in action by humans: it essentially aims at 
something beyond itself, and so does not have the right teleological structure to be the 
best and most teleios end (NE X 7, 1177b17-18).58  Consequently, one has reason to be a 
monist about the human good but a gradationist about eudaimonia. 
This sort of position allows one to accommodate some of the key motivations of 
both monists and inclusivists.  On the one hand, there is agreement with those monists 
who persuasively argue that the human good, in virtue of being the best and most teleios 
end, cannot include within it practically virtuous activity.59  Because the conclusion of 
the ergon argument is offered as a definition of the human good, it should then be 
interpreted monistically.  The human good, which is the primary case of human 
eudaimonia, is an activity of theoretical wisdom (“the best and most teleios virtue”) 
carried out over an optimal natural lifespan. On the other hand, there is agreement with 
those inclusivists who refuse to deny that the activity of moral virtue carried out over a 
whole life is a genuine case of eudaimonia.60  The gradationist picture also allows us to 
make sense of Aristotle’s later reformulations of his definition—reformulations for which 
 
57 “Eudaimonia especially [malista] seems to be this sort of thing” (NE I 7, 1097a34).  Cooper (2003) 2004, 
281-282 argues for this point. 
58 See the arguments of Lear 2004. 
59 Thus, I am sympathetic with the arguments advanced by Cooper (2003) 2004 and Lear 2004. 
60 Bush 2008 correctly observes that the monistic reasoning of Cooper (2003) 2004 and Lear 2004 leads 
them to deny that virtuous practical activity can in any way constitute eudaimonia.  However, they still 
want to claim that the person who engages in such an activity is happy, but only because he is organizing 
his life by reference to the best and most teleios end, which is theoretically wise contemplation. 
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strict monistic interpretations seem procrustean at best.61  Take, for example, NE I 13, 
1102a5-7: “Since eudaimonia is some activity of the soul on the basis of teleios virtue, 
we should examine virtue, for perhaps in this way we will better see what eudaimonia 
is.”  Because this is presented as a definition of (human) eudaimonia and not of the 
human good, one is free to hear it as something that could be satisfied to different 
degrees.  When Aristotle here speaks of “teleios virtue” (NE I 13, 1102a6), that phrase 
may be satisfied by whole character virtue (NE V 1, 1130a11-13), satisfied still better by 
general justice (NE V 1, 1129b25-30), and satisfied best of all by theoretical wisdom (NE 
X 7, 1177a24).  
However, the picture that I have just presented does have the odd sounding result 
that a ethically virtuous person might attain human eudaimonia, albeit to a secondary 
degree, while at the same time failing to attain the human good. This might incline one 
want to subscribe to gradationism about both human happiness and the human good. If 
we want to read the NE I 7 definition as compatible with this sort of view, then we would 
need to understand Aristotle to be offering that definition by reference to the best and 
primary case of the human good.62 Aristotle does seem to adopt a method like this 
elsewhere (e.g. Pol I 5, 1254a36-39), and it is not unreasonable. For example, when we 
give an account of the human body, we should look to the best case and note that the 
body has e.g. two arms and two legs, even if we are also prepared to admit that there are 
human bodies without this number of limbs. Similarly and more aptly for our purposes, 
when we give an account of health, we should do so by reference to the best case of 
health, even if we also think that health comes in degrees and that some states of the 
body, which fall below this best case, should still be called “health” (cf. Cael II 12, 
292b13-19; NE X 3, 1173a24-25). Thus, we should understand the end of the medical art 
to be the best case of health (cf. Pol I 9, 1257b25-28), even though the doctor will often 
have to settle for producing a much lower degree of health in many of his patients. 
 
61 See Lawrence 1993, 29n.31 for an intelligent but defeated attempt to reconcile the reformulations with a 
monistic reading of the full definition in NE I 7. 
62 Broadie 2002, 278 would seem to recommend reading the definition in NE I 7 along these lines. Here I 
should also clarify that I do not think that one can hear the definition of NE I 7 as being satisfied to 
different degrees, even though I do think that one might hear the definition at NE I 13 in this way.  The 
reason is because, in NE I 7, in order for the phrase “best and most teleios virtue” to refer to general justice, 
one must restrict the virtues in question to character virtues, but by so doing you would change the meaning 
of the phrase “best and most teleios virtue.”  
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Similarly, we should understand the end of political wisdom to be the best case of the 
human good, which is a sufficiently long activity of theoretical wisdom, even though the 
legislator will often have to settle for producing some much lower degree of the human 




I take this paper to be the first serious response to Ackrill’s influential claim that 
the definition of the human good can follow from the premises of the ergon argument 
only if it is interpreted along inclusivist lines. I have articulated the key assumptions that 
have lead Ackrill and others to make this claim (or similar claims), and I have also 
explained how one might reasonably deny the assumptions. One of the linchpins of my 
argument has been to assume that Aristotle in NE I 7 is using the alternative concept of 
an ergon—on which the ergon of an X may be a proper activity or a proper product (i.e. 
something produced beyond a proper activity), depending on what the X is. This concept 
allows the key explanatory middle term of the argument to be “the best achievement of a 
human,” and it allows for an interpretation on which the final two additions (“on the basis 
of the best and most teleios virtue” and “in a teleios life”) are not optional clarifications 
but further requirements that something must meet if it is to count as the human good. On 
such a reading, I contend, a monistic reading of the definition can indeed follow from the 
premises of the ergon argument. In order to respond to some potential objections, I have 
sketched a broader picture of Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia and the human good, and 
on that picture, anyone reading the definition in NE I 7 retrospectively will have reason to 
read it monistically. 
A few closing remarks on my interpretation are now perhaps in order. First, 
Aristotle makes the additions “on the basis of the best and most teleios virtue” and “in a 
teleios life” in order to distinguish the best achievement of a human from a merely 
excellent one. This allows for the possibility that Aristotle might need to add yet further 
criteria in order to more accurately “narrow in” on the best achievement of a human, and 
 
63 Thus, on the gradationist picture that I propose, the practically wise person would not have a problematic 
“dual focus” on two teleologically unrelated ends—which is something that Lear 2004, 88-90 critiques in 
the accounts of Charles 1999 and Scott 1999. 
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he perhaps does just this in NE I 11 when he makes the addition “adequately furnished 
with external goods” (1101a15, cf. I 8, 1099a31-32). Second, “the best achievement of a 
human” should be understood as absolutely best achievement of a human. That is, 
Aristotle in the ergon argument crucially relies on some notion of absolute goodness—
goodness that is not reducible to “goodness in a kind” or “good for something.” Aristotle 
clearly relies on a notion of absolute goodness elsewhere in the NE, where for example, 
he argues that sophia is better than phronesis precisely because the objects of sophia are 
better and “more divine” than the objects of phronesis (NE VI 7). Thus, even though the 
human good is somehow relative to a human, its goodness does not merely consist in 
being relative to a human: it is also somehow absolutely good.64 Third and lastly, the 
reasoning that I detect in the ergon argument is perhaps alone compatible with a 
straightforward reading of Aristotle’s exhortation “to put on immortality as much as 
possible” (ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, NE X 7, 1177b33).65 For if the virtuous agent 
desires the absolutely best thing that he can achieve, and the divine is the standard for all 
such goodness (NE X 8, 1178b21-23), he will be anxious to test and even surpass the 




Cael De Caelo [On the Heavens] 
EE Eudemian Ethics 
Meta Metaphysics 
NE Nicomachean Ethics 
MM Magna Moralia 




64 See Baker 2017 in which I argue contra Kraut 2011, 210-21 that some notion of absolute goodness is 
integral to the argument of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
65 I have in mind the sort of reading that is given by e.g. Sedley 2000, 324-328. 
66 For helpful comments on various versions of this paper, I thank Marjolein Oele, Benjamin Morison, 
Hendrik Lorenz, John Cooper, Victor Caston, three anonymous referees, and audiences at the University of 
South Alabama and the 2014 Bay Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. 
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